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Abstract
This article discusses the notion of a ‘European Social Union’, in which
European countries would cooperate with an explicit social purpose. A
European Social Union should not be seen as an idealistic bridge too far.
Instead, a Social Union is both desirable and necessary for the eurozone and
wider European integration.

Introduction
In this article, I argue that we need to develop a coherent conception of a
European Social Union. I use the expression ‘Social Union’ deliberately, for
three reasons. First, it invites us to propose a clear-cut concept, in contrast to
the rather vague notion of ‘a social Europe’, which often surfaces in discus-
sions on the EU. Second, it signals that we should go beyond the conventional
call for the EU to gain a ‘social dimension’. As a matter of fact, it would be
wrong to assert that the EU has no social dimension today. The coordination
of social security rights for mobile workers, standards for health and safety in
the workplace, directives on workers’ rights… This constitutes a non-trivial
acquis of fifty years of piecemeal progress. The EU also developed a solid legal
foundation from which to enforce non-discrimination among EU citizens. The
notion of a ‘European Social Union’ is not premised on a denial of that posi-
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tive acquis. But if the next steps we have to take can build on that acquis, their
nature and rationale respond to a new challenge. We have to understand the
novelty of that challenge, which is about more than just adding ‘a social
dimension’. Third, the emphasis on a Social Union is not a coincidence. A
European Social Union is not a European Welfare State: it is a Union of
national Welfare States.
Proposing a European Social Union may seem an idealistic bridge too far,
given the state of play of European politics today. However, I hope to show
that the idea is neither far-fetched nor unduly idealistic. The core idea can be
summarised as follows: a Social Union would support national welfare states
on a systemic level in some of their key functions and guide the substantive
development of national welfare states – via general social standards and objec-
tives, leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States – on the basis
of an operational definition of ‘the European social model’. In other words,
European countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose
– hence, the expression ‘European Social Union’ (ESU).
From the outset, some misunderstandings should be avoided. Below I will
insist on the necessity of convergence, but convergence is not the same as
harmonisation. More generally, the practice of a Social Union should be far
removed from a top-down, ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to social policymaking
in the Member States. Also, a Social Union is not a defensive ‘Maginot line’
to preserve the social status quo; European welfare states are in a continuous
process of reform and many need further reform. Finally, the notion of ESU
does not point to a parallel and separate social pillar to be added to the existing
pillars.
A Social Union, so conceived, is not only desirable but necessary. To make
that analysis is not to say that an operational concept of ESU is already on the
table. We are in unchartered territory: important issues need to be clarified.
First of all, we must be clear about the rationale and motivation for a ESU;
that is the subject of the first part of this article. In section 1, I distinguish
arguments applying specifically to the eurozone from arguments applying to the
EU as a whole. In section 2, I introduce the notion of solidarity underpinning
a Social Union, and I argue that the idea of ESU marks a return to the inspi-
ration of the founding fathers of the European project. The second part of this
article links the idea of a Social Union to current debates on social policy.
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Section 3 presents ‘social investment’ as a unifying policy concept for the EU.
Section 4 briefly argues that clarification is needed with regard to policy meth-
odologies and tools (notably: mainstreaming, contractual arrangements, and a
possible eurozone stabilisation scheme). Section 5 discusses minimum wages
and minimum income protection. Finally, a conclusion is provided.
1. Why do we need a European Social Union?
1.1. The incomplete monetary union
The case for a European Social Union is first and foremost based on a func-
tional argument with regard to EMU. Members of a currency area are
confronted with a trade-off between symmetry and flexibility. In textbooks on
monetary unions, the need for flexibility is explained in terms of wage and
price flexibility, labour mobility, and migration, which determine a country’s
internal adjustment capacity. Flexibility implies choices that are not socially
neutral: less regulated labour markets, temporary shock absorbing mechanisms
such as ‘Kurzarbeit’ in Germany, a highly skilled and versatile labour force…
All provide different ways and means to achieve labour market flexibility,
which can be mixed in different ways, according to social preferences. There
might be a ‘high road’ to labour market flexibility, based predominantly on
skills, as opposed to a ‘low road’, based predominantly on mere deregulation of
labour markets. Relying on migration as an adjustment variable and making a
success of it, implies societal choices par excellence.
Economic textbooks define symmetry in economic terms, but sustaining
symmetry in the long run may imply a degree of social convergence: there seem
to be limits to the diversity in social systems that can be accommodated in a
monetary union, not with regard to the details of their organisation, but with
regard to their fundamental parameters. The insistence of the European
Commission that retirement ages be indexed on longevity in all European
Member States can be interpreted in this sense: apart from the fact that it may
be good policy per se, for any welfare state, to establish a link between retire-
ment ages and longevity, it is plausible to argue that unsustainable pension
systems in some Member States of the eurozone would lead to budgetary imbal-
ances that threaten the eurozone as such.
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The previous paragraph suggests the need of a long-term perspective of social
convergence. From a short-term perspective, the automatic stabilisation
capacity that normally characterises welfare states has been constrained by the
actual functioning of EMU. Hence, EMU should be equipped with a stabilisa-
tion mechanism to compensate for the decreased stabilisation capacity of
national welfare states. That presupposes more solidarity in the eurozone than
is present at this moment. Neither flexibility nor symmetry, nor indeed a stabi-
lisation mechanism, are socially neutral choices. By the process of monetary
unification, a consensus on the social order which the monetary union has to
serve is forced upon the participating countries. This entails discussions about
sensitive social issues such as the degrees of freedom between countries with
regard to pension systems and retirement age; but also with regard to the skills
of their labour force and educational achievements; with regard to the role of
migration, etc.
We not only need a consensus on the concept; we also need a convergence of
fundamental social parameters. What we see today is the exact opposite:
increasing divergence which undermines the sustainability of the EMU. Exces-
sive social imbalances threaten the monetary union as much as excessive
economic imbalances (Vandenbroucke et al., 2013b). The expression ‘exces-
sive social imbalances’ describes a set of social problems that affect member
states very differently (thus creating ‘imbalances’). Youth unemployment and
child poverty are two examples. These imbalances should be a matter of
common concern for all eurozone members. Politically, social divergence in the
eurozone threatens the sustainability of the project in that it will steadily
undermine the credibility of the European project. In economic terms, current
levels of youth unemployment and child poverty in Europe illustrate inadequate
investment in human capital on a massive scale. A comparatively high level of
youth unemployment and child poverty is synonymous with an investment
deficit that may be cause and effect in a vicious circle of underperforming
labour markets, child care, education systems and transfer systems. If some
members of the eurozone get trapped into such a vicious circle, the resulting
bad equilibrium creates a problem with regard to the economic symmetry that is
required among the members of a monetary union.
In sum, (1) managing the trade-off between symmetry and flexibility, (2)
repairing the decreased stabilisation capacity of welfare states, and (3)
preventing excessive social imbalances presuppose an operational basic
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consensus on common, normatively charged objectives of social policy within
the eurozone.
1.2. Integration and social regulation in the EU28
Other arguments in favour of adding an active social dimension to the EU
transcend the eurozone problematic, as they apply to the EU as a whole. A
well-known argument holds that economic integration without social harmoni-
sation induces downward pressure on social development in the most advanced
Member States. Although in the past the spectre of large-scale social dumping
has never materialised, in the enlarged EU of today blatant cases of illegal
working conditions and exploitation do occur, resulting from the interplay of
lacunae in the domestic implementation of social and employment protection in
the Member States, reduced legal sovereignty of the Member States, and the
absence of common social standards in a very heterogeneous entity.
Fears of social dumping, but also welfare tourism, are causing considerable
social and political tensions with regard to labour migration. These discussions
will not be easily resolved, but a crucial condition for European public opinion
to accept migration is that migration and posting of workers should fit into a
regulated social order not undermine it. Hence the importance of the recent
agreement reached by Social Affairs Ministers (December 2013) on the contro-
versial posting-of-workers enforcement directive. The latter is supposed to
resolve various legal, administrative and practical forms of abuse, circumven-
tion of regulations, and fraudulent practices when workers are temporarily
posted in another country. The revised directive now falls to negotiations
between EU countries and the European Parliament.
The extent to which Member States can uphold social standards in a context of
free movement is particularly relevant with regard to minimum wages. In
Member States such as Germany and Sweden, trade unions traditionally
resisted state regulation of minimum wages: they considered that it fell under the
purview of collective bargaining and that it was a no-go area for public authori-
ties; thus, they applied a domestic principle of subsidiarity. The Viking and
Laval judgments by the European Court of Justice suggest that that traditional
position may be unsustainable: the Court argues that only predictable systems of
minimum wage protection can be imposed on foreign companies that post
workers, i.e. Member States must create a legal context in which only generally
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applicable minimum wage protection has to be respected by foreign service
providers. If that argument is accepted, it would mean that social partners
should reconsider traditional positions on subsidiarity within welfare states, i.e.
they should reconsider the respective roles of social partners and public authori-
ties, or reconsider the relation between nationwide collective bargaining and
local bargaining. The actual responses in Sweden and Denmark to the Laval
case reaffirm the autonomy of collective bargaining, but introduce conditions for
the exercise of collective action: collective agreements can only be enforced
through collective action against foreign service providers if they correspond to
existing nationwide collective agreements and do not define conditions beyond
the hard core of the posted workers directive (Blauberger, 2012). Hence, the
Swedish and Danish domestic responses also change the rules of the game in
terms of the subsidiarity of the national versus local level. Politically, this
strengthens the case for a pan-European framework with regard to the concept
and regulation of minimum wages: both at the domestic and the European level,
we must reconsider the application of subsidiarity principles.
Fundamentally, the challenge is to preserve the regulatory capacity of national
governments and social partners, whilst allowing labour migration and the
cross-border delivery of services. Reconciling national regulatory capacity with
mobility has also constituted – and still constitutes – a challenge in the domain
of health care. The impact of the European legal constellation – notably legis-
lation shaping the internal market – on a sector such as health care shows that
a neat separation between ‘market issues’, belonging to the supranational
sphere, and ‘social issues’, belonging to the national spheres, is unsustainable.
In 2002, I was inspired by this observation to propose a ‘horizontal social
clause’ in the European legal architecture, to provide clearer guidance to all
European institutions in the grey area between state and markets (Vanden-
broucke, 2002). That idea found its way, via the Lisbon Treaty, into Article 9
TFEU, which formulates the requirement that all EU actions take into
account ‘the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of
education, training and protection of human health’. Will this clause play an
important role in guiding the Court of Justice and other key actors? Will it
serve as a reference for social impact assessments? The jury is still out. So far,
the horizontal social clause did not play a visible role when designing macro-
economic adjustment programmes – where it should have played a role.
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2. A shared notion of solidarity
The foregoing discussion shows that we have to combine two perspectives on
the meaning of solidarity in Europe: a pan-European notion of solidarity and
solidarity within national welfare states. The pan-European notion of soli-
darity refers to upward economic convergence and cohesion on a European
scale. But it also refers to the rights of individuals to improve their own lives
by working in a Member State other than the Member State where they were
born, or to the rights of patients to benefit, under certain conditions, from
medical care in other Member States than their state of residence, etc. Soli-
darity within national Member States refers to social insurance, income redis-
tribution, and the balance of social rights and obligations, which define
national welfare states. This dual perspective on solidarity – when used in the
European context – makes it inherently complex and multifaceted. There
should be no denying that it can imply trade-offs between national solidarity
and pan-European solidarity, certainly in the short term. However, the polit-
ical legitimacy of the European project depends on its capacity to avoid a nega-
tive trade-off or, in other words, to avoid a zero-sum game between national
cohesion and pan-European cohesion. In yet other words, the legitimacy of the
European project requires a virtuous circle of growing pan-European and
national cohesion. Sustaining such a virtuous circle should be the primary
objective of a European Social Union.
In fact, this means that we should revisit the fundamental goals that have been
part and parcel of the European project since the Treaty of Rome of 1957: the
simultaneous pursuit of economic progress on the one hand, and of social
progress and cohesion on the other, both within countries (through the gradual
development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward
convergence across the Union). The founding fathers of the European project
optimistically assumed that growing cohesion between and within countries
could be reached by supranational economic cooperation, together with some
specific instruments for raising the standard of living across the Member States
(which were later brought together in the EU's ‘economic, social and territo-
rial’ cohesion policy). Economic integration was to be organised at the EU
level, and would boost economic growth and create upward convergence;
domestic social policies were to redistribute the fruits of economic progress,
while remaining a national prerogative. Consecutive enlargements as well as
monetary unification made this complex notion of solidarity even more
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demanding and difficult to handle. Indeed, what is seen by some as ‘the
dynamics of upward convergence’ associated with the enlargement of the EU,
is seen as social dumping by others. At the same time, the discussion above
demonstrated that monetary unification requires forms of solidarity which
were, thus far, a no-go area in European politics. We risk getting caught in a
trap: we badly need more European solidarity, whilst it is becoming more diffi-
cult to manage. Instead of a virtuous circle, that is a vicious circle.
3. The social investment imperative
How can we create a virtuous circle whereby both pan-European cohesion and
national cohesion are enhanced? There is a huge disparity in the performance
of European welfare states. They also display very different profiles with
regard to the educational achievement of their population. The southern EU15
Member States combine low employment rates with a high share of people
with no more than lower secondary education. The OECD PISA tests of the
skills of 15-year old students also illustrate the disparity across Europe with
regard to investment in human capital in today’s younger generation, with
weak average scores for countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain (and even
weaker scores for Bulgaria and Romania). I do not suggest that there is a
simple causal relationship between educational attainment and employment: it
is the combination of a poor record in employment and education that is so
alarming. These data not only illustrate the particular deficit of Southern
eurozone welfare states – compared to other eurozone members – with regard
to education and employment, they also underscore the huge education agenda
the whole EU is confronted with. The European Union certainly recognises
the challenge: in the Europe 2020 agenda, reducing the number of early
school-leavers is singled out as one of the headline targets. The European
Commission has developed a comprehensive agenda on education, training and
skills, and issued excellent recommendations on the modernisation of educa-
tion systems. However, the question remains as to whether this educational
agenda carries sufficient weight at the highest levels of European political deci-
sion-making and in the setting of budgetary priorities: the answer seems nega-
tive. Real public expenditure on education was lower in 2011 than in pre-crisis
2008 in 10 Member States, including those that badly need to improve their
education system. That is not to say that the quality of education systems can
be measured in simply by looking at the level of public spending on education,
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but it seems very hard to improve education systems significantly whilst
disinvesting.
The strong record of Northern welfare states, with regard to both employment
and poverty, has been linked to their long-term orientation towards ‘social
investment’, i.e. activation, investment in human capital, and capacitating
social services such as child care (Hemerijck, 2013). Obviously, investment in
education and child care are no panacea; welfare states also differ with regard
to the effectiveness of their social protection systems. For instance, Greece does
not have a system of minimum income assistance, and minimum income
protection in Italy is generally considered to be inadequate. Cash transfer
systems are highly fragmented in a number of welfare states. Welfare state
performance depends on the complementarity of effective investment in human
capital – by means of education, training and child care – and effective protec-
tion of human capital – by means of adequate transfer systems and health care.
The redistributive role of social protection remains important per se (Cantillon
and Vandenbroucke, 2014).
So conceived, a social investment strategy offers an interesting perspective,
with regard to both pan-European cohesion and national cohesion.Social
investment emerged gradually as a social policy perspective in the 1990s in
response to fundamental changes in our societies, with a focus on policies that
‘prepare’ individuals, families, and societies to adapt to various transformations
(such as changing career patterns and working conditions, the emergence of
new social risks, and ageing populations) rather than on simply generating
responses aimed at ‘repairing’ damage caused by market failure, social misfor-
tune, poor health, or prevailing policy inadequacies. Social investment is not
an easy panacea. Successful social investment presupposes a well-designed
complementarity between ‘protecting human capital’ by means of traditional
instruments of social protection (cash benefits, health care) and ‘developing
human capital’, by means of education, training and activation.
The Social Investment Package, launched by the European Commission
(2013a) in February 2013, presents a similar argument and provides an inter-
esting common orientation for EU Member States with its focus on early child-
hood education and care, preventing early school leaving, lifelong learning,
affordable child care (as part of an active inclusion strategy), housing support
(fighting homelessness), accessible health services and helping people live inde-
pendently in old age. Together with Anton Hemerijck and Bruno Palier,
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I called for a true ‘Social Investment Pact’ for the EU (Vandenbroucke,
Hemerijck, Palier, 2011). Obviously, a ‘Package’ is not a ‘Pact’; the idea of a
‘Pact’ underscores the sense of reciprocity that is needed: all Member States
should be committed to policies that respond to the need for social investment;
simultaneously, Member States’ efforts in this direction – notably efforts by
Member States who face a difficult budgetary and economic context – should
be supported in a tangible way.
4. The need to clarify policy methods and tools
In section 1, I wrote that excessive social imbalances threaten the monetary
union as much as excessive economic imbalances. The first step to restoring
(upward) convergence is to fight such excessive social imbalances, notably
within the eurozone. This requires a toolkit, in which three types of instrument
are made to work in the same direction: general mainstreaming, contractual
arrangements, and the European Funds.
Fernandes and Maslauskaite (2013a) rightly argue that the social dimension
should be mainstreamed into all EU policies, notably into macroeconomic and
budgetary surveillance, rather than it being constituted as a separate social
pillar. In principle, the Europe 2020 frame should guarantee such main-
streaming; in practice, the social and education objectives of Europe 2020 do
not carry the same weight as the economic and budgetary objectives. This is,
first and foremost, a political problem, and solving it presupposes the willing-
ness to take social objectives into account at the highest level of EU decision-
making. But apart from that, although the notion of mainstreaming seems
straightforward, clarification is needed about the institutional actors that
should take the lead in it and exactly how this should be done. Refining the
MIP Scoreboard, which is used in the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure,
was a first step towards such mainstreaming. Social and employment indicators
have indeed been added to the set of ‘auxiliary indicators’ that are used in the
economic reading of the MIP Scoreboard. However, some nervousness exists
about the ownership and control of the process in which they will be used.As a
matter of fact, there is more than one ‘scoreboard’. Next to the auxiliary indi-
cators in the MIP, a scoreboard of (a few) employment and social indicators
was adopted by the EPSCO Council in December 2013, to inform macroeco-
nomic and fiscal policies, both at EU and national levels, in the context of the
European Semester. In itself, that can be seen as promising. However, the
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European Council’s confirmation of “the relevance of the use of a scoreboard
of key employment and social indicators” (European Council, 2013: §38) and
especially that “the use of this wider range of indicators will have the sole
purpose of allowing a broader understanding of social developments” (Ibid:
§39) is unsatisfactory. The precise role of this new scoreboard vis-à-vis the
strong analytical tools developed recently by the EPSCO Council – the
Employment Performance Monitor and Social Protection Performance Monitor
– should be further defined. Finally, mainstreaming should include monitoring
the impact of social and labour market reforms in Member States having signed
a Memorandum of Understanding. In short, if mainstreaming social policy
objectives is deemed necessary, the content, the process, and the role of the
different policy strands have to be clarified, in order to make such main-
streaming effective and legitimate in the perception of all actors involved.
Well-conceived contractual arrangements between the EU and the Member
States – proposed by the European Commission as part of a ‘convergence and
competitiveness instrument’ (European Commission, 2012, 2013b) – may be a
way forward if they are based on the genuine reciprocity that is objectively
needed in the EU today. The idea of contractual arrangements raises many
issues, as explained in the article by Xavier Vanden Bosch and StijnVerhelst.
The key question is whether the contracts envisage a bilateral top-down
approach with the Council and the Commission dictating policies to specific
countries (a ‘principal-agent model’ with financial incentives), or alternatively,
solidarity in commonly agreed structural welfare state reform. In the run-up to
the December Council, many governments, including the Belgian government,
have taken a rather defensive approach in the discussion about contractual
arrangements. In a sense, this is understandable, given the impression that
these contracts would simply reinforce a top-down implementation model of
policies that are controversial in Member States. However, a less defensive
approach in this debate is needed if one wants to turn the proposal into ‘soli-
darity in structural welfare reform’. So conceived, the questions at hand echo
the questions raised with regard to the European funds. Cohesion policy is
supporting ‘inclusive growth’ more effectively than it did before, mainly thanks
to a concentration of efforts. The case could be made that not only the ESF,
but also the ERDF and other funds should support the employment and social
policy thematic objectives, and have corresponding social investment priorities.
There is a risk that the contractual arrangements overlap with existing cohe-
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sion policy programmes with a clear social commitment. Contractual arrange-
ments and cohesion policy operational programmes should be made consistent
and complementary policy tools, in order to increase – instead of merely substi-
tute – efforts at the EU level in employment and social policies.
The paragraph focused on solidarity in structural reform. A separate question
concerns the organisation of solidarity in adverse cyclical circumstances. For
the sake of brevity, I will not develop this important issue here; I refer the
reader to the article by Xavier Vanden Bosch and StijnVerhelst.
5. Minimum wages and minimum income protection
In their joint statement of 29 May 2013, France and Germany proposed
‘considering implementing minimum wage floors, defined at national level that
would guarantee a high level of employment and fair wages – leaving the choice
between legislation and collective-bargaining agreements.’ Interestingly, this joint
statement immediately added a consideration on the enhancement of cross-
border mobility, ‘calling for encouraging cross-border worker mobility by
removing obstacles, improving cooperation between employment services (building
upon the EURES platform) and facilitating the portability of rights in case of
mobility’ (Bundesregierung (2013)). This lends support to the idea that cross-
border mobility is a positive development, if organised in compliance with
existing social regulation, such as decent minimum wages.
Eurofound (2013) published an in-depth investigation of proposals with regard
to European minimum wage coordination. It shows that a European minimum
wage threshold at 60% of national median wages would be very demanding in
terms of the number of workers affected and the increase in wage levels at the
bottom end of the income distribution. A pan-European approach would also
encounter huge institutional difficulties, given the differences in wage-setting
institutions across the EU. Simultaneously, the report notes a number of argu-
ments in favour of minimum wage coordination at the European level, such as
the fact that it would minimise the negative effects on intra-European competi-
tiveness. A gradual approach might therefore be appropriate. The report also
underscores that the main justification for minimum wages is not the reduction
of poverty (the impact on poverty is rather limited, since household poverty is
more related to not working at all than to having low wages); the essential –
and important – justification for minimum wages is the establishment of
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minimum labour standards below which no employment relationship is consid-
ered socially acceptable.
With regard to fighting poverty, the EAPN (European Anti-Poverty Network)
proposes a draft directive on adequate minimum income. It would stipulate that
‘every Member State shall introduce a minimum income scheme, that guaran-
tees the right to an adequate minimum income to all people living on their
territory’ (EAPN, 2010). The objective would be to ensure that the combined
effect of their minimum income provisions and other policy measures are suffi-
cient to lift all individuals above the poverty threshold (60% of the national
median income, in a first stage). A European framework with regard to
minimum income protection would indeed give substance and political salience
to social rights in a ‘caring Europe’. But, given the heterogeneity between
European Member States, any binding agreements on minimum income would
have to be introduced flexibly and gradually, and implemented in unison with a
convergence in activation measures and minimum wage (Vandenbroucke et al,
2013a). Moreover, since such a scheme – even if it is moderate in its initial
ambition – requires a significantly greater budgetary effort on behalf of some of
the poorer Member States in Eastern and Southern Europe, it raises a complex
question about the meaning of solidarity within the EU.
In the poorer Member States ‘the rich’ are poorer than ‘the poor’ in the richer
Member States. Hence, a minimal condition for a ‘caring Europe’, that
attempts to upscale minimum income protection, is that it should help the
poorer Member States, not just by opening up markets and implementing
successful macro-economic policies at the EU level, but also by putting at their
disposal generous Structural Funds for the foreseeable future. Simultaneously,
a caring Europe would put positive pressure on poorer and richer Member
States to gradually improve the overall quality and efficiency of their welfare
regimes. Introducing conditionality with regard to aspects of social inclusion
policy in the European Social Fund may be one way to develop more leverage.
Simultaneously, existing strategies – notably Europe 2020 – should be taken
seriously and given real bite. If this were the overall context, then the prospect
of gradually introducing a more binding EU framework on minimum income
protection may become realistic and useful, for the political reasons indicated
above and as a measure to increase the quality and efficiency of domestic social
systems. Fundamentally, enhanced solidarity within Member States cannot be
decoupled from enhanced solidarity among Member States – and vice versa.
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Conclusions: from a sense of survival to a sense of common 
purpose
The eurozone must be supplemented with a genuine social dimension for it to
be sustainable in the long term. A Social Union would support national
welfare states on a systemic level in some of their key functions (such as macro-
economic stabilisation) and guide the substantive development of national
welfare states – via general social standards and objectives, leaving ways and
means of social policy to Member States – on the basis of an operational defi-
nition of ‘the European social model’. In other words, European countries
would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose – hence, the expres-
sion ‘European Social Union’. Such a ESU is not only desirable, it is also
necessary.
My arguments with regard to EMU are premised on the idea that the tuning of
economic strategies requires a minimal tuning of social policy, even if this
should not lead to the application of an undifferentiated social policy: Member
States should retain sovereignty in specific areas (e.g. the organisation of
health care), and they must be able to effectively assume the responsibilities
they bear. That is one of the reasons why the idea of a Social Union is not
confined to the eurozone, although some specific arguments only apply to the
eurozone. At the level of the EU28, we must deepen our mutual understanding
of the social goals to be achieved by market integration and the mobility of
people, services, goods and capital; and it must be possible to maintain princi-
ples of social regulation that serve those goals.
The practice of a Social Union should be far removed from a top-down, ‘one
size fits all’ approach to social policymaking in the Member States. What is
needed today is a more balanced approach to macro-economic coordination, i.e.
a combination of greater room for manoeuvre and tangible support for Member
States that opt for a social investment strategy, and policy guidance based on
clear and sufficiently stringent and constraining objectives with regard to well-
defined social outcomes on the one hand, and genuine scope for exploration and
mutual learning on the ways and means to achieve those outcomes on the other
hand.
A Social Union is not a defensive Maginot Line to fight yesterday’s battles: we
need reform, not a status quo. In policy terms, the challenge is to make long-
term social investments and medium-term fiscal consolidation mutually
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supportive and sustainable, under improved financial and economic govern-
ance. In political terms, European citizens need a reformist perspective that
gives the social acquis they cherish a credible future. A European Social Union
should build on that acquis; simultaneously, building on that acquis requires
reform. That is the quintessence of the call for a ‘social investment pact’.
At the moment of writing, signs of economic recovery are getting stronger.
Maybe, the actions of the Member States will no longer be guided by day-to-
day crisis management. However, without a sense of common purpose, it will
not be possible to overcome the legacy of the crisis; it will not be possible to
avoid the spectre of sluggish economic growth for many years; and it will not
be possible to fight the mounting euroscepticism.1 Moving from a ‘sense of
survival’ to a ‘sense of common purpose’ is a basic condition for building a
Social Union.
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